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Case No. 16543 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATR~ENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Appellants initiated this action in the Court of the 
Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake county, utah, 
praying for an Extraordinary Writ to review and reverse the 
ruling of the City Council of the City of Midvale, which 
revoked the business license held by Appellants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake county, 
Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge presiding, entered 
its Order affirming the action of the City Council of the 
City of 11idvale. 
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RELIEF' SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of the District Court's 
Order which affirmed the nuisance abatement method used by 
respondents in revoking the business license of appellants; 
and in the event this Court upholds the lower Court's 
decision, a restraining order pending the final determination 
of plaintiffs/appellants' CoMplaint pending in lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF PACTS 
Appellants began operating a business kno~n as Judd's 
Frontier Club, at 7890 South State Street, Midvale, Utah, on 
or about December, 1976, pursuant to a business license 
obtained from the Midvale City. Appellants are in the 
business of selling beer and soft drinks and operate what is 
commonly known as a "beer bar"; appellants do not possess 
a license to, nor sell, or dispense "hard liquor" pursuant 
to any authority or licensing by the Utah Liquor Control 
Commission. 
On or about May 15, 1978, the individual defendants, 
acting as the mayor and the city council of Midvale City, 
held a public hearing for the purpose of considering the 
revocation of the business license theretofore issued 
to appellants. 
On or about May 30, 1978, the Midvale City Counc~l 
issued its Findings of Fact and Order revoking aooellants' 
business licenses, findi~g that appellants were maintaining 
a public nuisance contrary to the city ordinances. 
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After the Order of revocation appellants filed this 
action in District Court and obtained a Temporary Restraining 
Order. Appellants' Complaint states several causes of action, 
and, concurrently, appellants' amended Complaint sought the 
relief provided for under Rules 65A and 65B of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to the appellate review 
on the certified record. 
The District Court, the. Honorable Judge James S. Sawaya 
presiding, after a hearing which was held on June 12, 1979, 
entered its Order (pages 128 and 129 of this record) affirming 
the action of revocation theretofore taken by the City 
Council; said order was entered on June 25, 1979. 
On June 27, 1979, appellants by and through their attorney 
of record, Nick J. Colessides, filed a Notice of Appeal, 
appealing the order entered by Judge Sawaya, to the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
On June 29, 1979, respondents filed their ~1otion to Amend 
Findings and Order (page 136 of this record) and after a brief 
conference among all counsel and Judge Sawaya, the trial Court 
entered its order granting respondents their motion to " 
amend the Order entered hereinto on the 25th day of June, 1979." 
Subsequently thereto, respondents filed and the Court 
approved Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (page 137 
to 142) and the Court entered its Amended Order of Judgment 
(pages 143 to 144). 
-3-
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Appellants' Complaint alleging certain other causes of 
action is presently pending before the Third Judicial District 
Court, and this appeal was necessitated by the fact that 
implicit in Judge Sawaya's Order and/or Amended Order, there 
was a dissolution of the Court's theretofore issued restrain-
ing order. 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO PROCEED 
UNDER THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY GIVEN 
TO CITIES TO ABATE PUBLIC NUISANCES. 
Respondents' theory of the right of revocation of 
the business license by the Midvale City Council is based upon 
a theory of nuisance and the abatement thereof. 
Utah law specifically provides for a meothd of abatement 
of a public nuisance and specifically sets forth the criteria 
of a public nuisance together with the exact procedure a public 
body must follow in order to abate a nuisance. 
Assuming arguendo that the acts complained of by respon-
dents are in fact true and within the state statutory or city 
authority section 76-10-808 specifically designates the forum 
where an abatement of the nuisa~ce shall occur. There, it is 
stated that a city attorney is empowered to institute an action 
in the name of the city to abate a public nuisance. Further 
it is stated therein: 
" ... The action shall be brought 
in the district court of the d1strict 
where the public nuisance exists and 
shall be in the form prescribed by 
the Rules of Civil Procedure .... " 
Nowhere in the Utah State Code the power to abate nuisances 
is given to a city council or other administrative body. It is 
exclusively within the province of the district and subject to 
the Rules of the Civil Procedure. 
-5-
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The fact that exclusive jurisdiction to abate a nuisance 
is vested with the district court is further buttressed by 
the provisions of section 78-38-1, wherein it defines a nuisance 
and makes it a 
subject of an action. Such action 
may be brought by any person ... ; and by the 
judgment the nuisance may be enjoined or abated, 
and damages may also be recovered. Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-38-1. (emphasis supplied). 
It is clear from this language that in dealing with 
nuisance abatement the law contemplates an action at law, to be 
tried in a court of competent jurisdiction, and a judgment to 
be entered thereunder; it is not contemplated nor authorized by 
state statute, that a city council may act as a forum to 
adjudicate the abatement of a nuisance. 
Furthermore, the provisions of section 76-10-808 provide 
for the relief to be granted in the event a nuisance is establis~ 
ed, and the relief contemplated is judicial relief which can be 
had pursuant to a judgment entered by a court. 
Respondents claim that appellants' conduct of their business 
creates a nuisance, as it is defined in Ordinance No. 7-2(d) 
of the ordinances of Midvale City, wherein it states: 
(d) Laws or ordinances are 
violated by licensees, agents, or 
patrons with the consent of know-
ledge of licensees upon such premises 
which tend to affect the public health, 
peace or morals are hereby declared 
to be nuisances. (emphasis added). 
R-109. 
-6-
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It was stipulated by counsel for respondents that the 
city in its proceedings relied upon the alleged violations 
of subsection (d) to revoke the business licenses of 
appellants (see Tr. p.22 to p.23 line 3). In essence 
the city relying upon a theory of nuisance sought to abate 
the alleged nuisance by revoking ap9ellants' business license, 
rather than file a civil action against appellants to abate an 
alleged nuisance which by necessity would have required the city 
to seek and obtain an independe~t judicial determination of 
the facts. 
Appellants do not quarrel with the right of respondents 
to abate a nuisance; only the method sought by the city to 
abate the alleged nuisance. Nevertheless, 
"The power of a municipal corporation to 
define, declare, a~d deal with a nuisance 
is restricted ... A municipalitY can pro-
vide that a particular buslness-ordinarily 
lawful and unobjectionable, e.g., a hotel 
[or as in this instance a "beer bar"] 
cannot operate after it has been found by 
a court of comoetent iurisdiction to be 
oPerated in a ~annerinjurious or dangerous 
to the public morals, health or safety. 
But such an adjudication must have been 
made by a court 1vith jurisdiction in the 
premises. McQuillin, Hunicipal Corporations, 
§24.64 (citations omitted). 
While a municipality has a right under its police power 
to declare and restrain nuisances such power is not an 
uncontrollable power at the will and whim of the local 
authorities. 
-7-
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" .•. Under the rule denying municipal 
power to declare as a nuisance that which 
is not a nuisance, a municipal corporation, 
cannot, under its police power or its 
specific power to suppress nuisances, 
suppress in toto or in part any legitimate 
business, trade or occupation which is 
not a nuisance per se, in fact or under 
state statute ... A fortiori, a municipality 
cannot make a nuisance that which state law 
expressly authorizes. Under the rule, indeed, 
to justify any municipal interference with 
the enjoyment of property as a nuisance, 
two facts must be established: first, that the 
property, either per se or in the manner of 
using it, is a nuisance, and, second, that the 
interference does not extend beyond what is 
necessary to correct the evil. At least, 
property rights cannot be taken away by an 
ordinance declaring that to be a nuisance 
which is not a nuisance per se or in fact ... 
McQuillin, §24.66, p.621 (citations omitted). 
There is no question t~at Midvale City has a right to 
adopt an ordinance declaring, defining and providing for the 
abatement of nuisances. But such an ordinance (7-2) must be 
in conformity with the general law and the laws relating to 
nuisances including the requirements of definiteness and 
certainty. 
" ... Generally, it is only a public and 
not a private nuisance that a municipal 
corooration can abate or have abated. 
Furthermore, it is only that which is a 
nuisance at common law, by declaration of 
statute or in fact that can be summarily 
abated by a municipal corporation ... 
Thus, vested rights in property cannot be 
destroyed summarily as a nuisance unless 
in a great emergency. Accordingly, a 
power given to it to abate nuisances in 
any manner it may deem expedient is not 
an unrestricted power ... The abatement must 
be limited by its necessity 
McQuillin, §24.74, p.633. 
-8-
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It is respectfully submitted that the City having failed 
to follow the statutory prescription for the abatement of a 
nuisance, which unequivocally contemplates a judicial deter-
mination of the allegations made by respondents, the city's 
action in revoking appellants' business license because they 
maintain a public nuisance is illegal; therefore, the trial 
Court should be reversed. 
-9-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE 
ACTION TAKEN BY MIDVALE CITY REVOKING 
APPELLANTS' BUSINESS LICENSE, AND THAT 
SUCH REVOCATION WAS ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS. 
There is little question that the revocation of a liquor 
license itself ordinarily rests in the studied discretion of 
the body which has been delegated such power. However, there 
does exist a question as to the proper exercise of such dis-
cretion; for while it is broad, it cannot be applied 
arbitrarily or capriciously. 
"The intentment of the law is that the 
discretionary decision shall be the out-
come of examination and consideration, and 
not a mere expression of personal will, and 
that the refusal of licensing authorities 
to issue a license without having made due 
inquiry into the relevant facts and without 
having stated its reason for such refusal 
is arbitrary .... " (45 Am Jur 2d 603, 
"Intoxicating Liquors", Sec. 161). 
Generally, a business license may be revoked by the issu-
ing authority for legal cause; with that appellants do not 
quarrel. However, what constitutes a legal cause is the heart 
All references are hereby made as follows: 
(a) Transcript of hearing before Judge Sawaya as "Tr." 
(b) Transcript of hearing before Midvale City Council as "Tr. :·t. 
(c) References to the record before the Utah Supreme Court as "F. 
-10-
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of the argument in appellants' case. Again referring to 
McQuillin for an elucidation of the principles governing the 
revocation of a business license, and particularly a beer or 
liquor license the following grounds have been set forth as 
those meriting a revocation of such license. 
" ... Conviction of a violation of an 
intoxicating liquor statute or ordinance 
usually affects the revocation or termin-
ation of a license thereunder .••• Other 
offenses which in particular cases have been 
deemed sufficient ground for revocation of a 
liquor license or permit have been, .•. the 
sale of, or traffic in narcotics, the sale 
of whiskey by a beer license, sale of beer 
or liquor to minors, female solicitation 
of sale of drinks on the licenses premises, 
permitting premises to be used as resort 
for prostitutes, and the maintenance of a 
nuisance offensive to common descency and 
morals. McQuillin, §26.197b, p.497, 
(citations omitted). 
Of all the grounds for revocation stated in the preceding 
paragraph only the last ground could possibly form the basis 
for a revocatoin in the instant case. But certainly the 
issuance of parking tickets and other police related activities 
a block and a half from appellants' place of business (Tr. M. 
p.83, lines 16 to 23) do not qualify as the "maintenance of a 
nuisance offensive to common descency and morals." 
"A revocation for 'cause' generally must be based on a 
violation of the liquor law or of regulations promulgated 
thereunder." 48 Corpus Juris Secundum 282, "Intoxicating Liquors" 
A lack of such determination abuses the Commission's discretion-
-11-
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ary power and makes its action arbitrary and capricious. 
"Capricious or arbitrary exercise of discretion 
by an administrative board can arise in only three 
ways, namely: (a) By neglecting or refusing to use 
reasonable diligence and care to procure such 
evidence as it is by law authorized to consider 
in exercising the discretion vested in it; (b) 
By failing to give candid and honest consideration 
of the evidence before it on which it is author-
ized to act in exercising its discretion; (c) By 
exercising its discertion in such a manner after 
a consideration of evidence before it as clearly 
to indicate that its action is based on conclu-
sions from the evidence such that reasonable men 
fairly and honestly considering the evidence 
must reach contrary conclusions." (Van De Vegt v. 
Board of Com'rs of Larimer County, 55 P2d 705, Colo. 
1936). 
While the liquor authorities need not follow t~e precise 
rules of evidence and procedure required to be followed by 
judicial officers, they can annul or suspend a license only 
on competent proof. Migliaccio v. O'Connell, 307 NY 566, 122 
NE 2d 914. 
This inquiry should consist of the taking and examining 
of evidence. The right to revoke or suspend a liquor permit 
as a general rule depends on the evidence presented. The burden 
is on the board or officer to prove the facts which constitute 
the causes which are alleged as grounds for revocation or sus-
pension. Cambell v. Galeno Chemical Co., N.Y. 50 S. Ct. 412, 
281 US 599, 74 L Ed 1063. As to the weight and sufficiency 
of such evidence, general rules of evidence apply as to 
whether it is sufficient to prove particular facts or violations. 
Arrow Distilleries v. Alexander, C.C.A., 109 F2d 397. Although 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt or overwhelming proof is not 
required, there must be substantial evidence of probative 
-12-
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character to sustain the action of the deciding body. It has 
been held that revocation cannot be based upon evidence which 
causes a mere suspicion of a violation of a liquor statute. 
Mahanoy Mfg. Co. v. Doran, D.C. Pa. 40 F2d 561. This Court 
went on to say at page 561, "The real question is not so much 
over the facts as over the other question of whether the truth 
of the charge was brought home to the permitee with that degree 
of certainty which would justify a revocation of the permit." 
There is no question that where a licensing board conducts 
a proper hearing and assigns a valid reason for refusing to 
grant a license, the courts, in the absence of a showing that 
the action of the board was an abuse of its plain legal duty 
in the premises, will not assume there was a lack of substantial 
reason for such action. However, appellants contend that such 
was not the case here. 
In O'Conner v. City of Moscow, 202 p2d 401, Idaho 1949, 
a case involving a question as to whether or not a city ordinance 
deeming any change of ownership of an existing business in which 
draft beer or liquor by the drink was sold to be a new or addi-
tional business and thus prohibited from operating within 
specified areas, the Idaho Court, at oage 405, stated: 
-13-
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"While a license. to operate a beer parlor 
••. does not confer any vested property 
right, yet if the city makes such 
businesses lawful by a permit or license 
it cannot arbitrarily, capriciously, or ' 
unreasonably impair, interfere with or 
eradicate the same." 
On page 67, 51 Am Jur 2d, "License and Permits", 
Sec. 62, it is said: 
"The weight to be given to evidence 
presented in a hearing in which it is 
sought to suspend or revoke a license 
rests •.• in the discretion of .•. body 
.•. conducting the hearing. However, 
it has been said that hearsay evidence, 
standing alone, is not sufficient to 
support the suspension or revocation of 
a license where the licensee is entitled 
to a hearing on the matter involved." 
(Emphasis added). 
In the instant case, the Midvale City Council considered 
no hard evidence but relied upon a simple summaries of the 
activities of the City Policy Department as it related to the 
vicinity of appellants' business premises and which had found 
numerous complaints of fighting, other disturbances and 
violations. These allegations have never been supported by 
hard evidence and the appellant maintains that they are un-
founded and are in effect hearsay allegations. 
Revocation of a license for cause has been said to con-
templare such cause as would render the licensee unfit to 
engage in the licensed activity with his fitness being judged 
in the light of the potential evil with which the legislature 
was concerned in enacting the licensing legislation. 
-14-
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This Court in deciding Anderson v. Utah County Board of 
county Commissioners, P 2d ___ , 1/4/79, addressed itself 
to the exact issue at bar by commenting on the nature of the 
governing body's act in its failure to renew a beer license: 
and the hearing had thereupon, and also the nature of the beer 
license as a valuable property right. This Court said: 
"The spirit of enterprise which impels a person 
to initiate and develop a business which pro-
vides services to the public and employment 
for others is vital to the common welfare. 
By the same token that a business must operate 
in accordance with lawful regulations and 
requirements it should be the policy of the law, 
and of officials charged with its administra-
tion, to encourage such initiative and enter-
prise by according it all proper protections 
of the law. In harmony with that purpose there 
should be considerable difference in 
determining whether an application for 
a new license should be granted, as compared 
with the renewal of a license where the busi-
ness has been established and operating for 
a number of years. 
There are respected authorities which affirm 
the proposition that the administrative body 
(the County Conunission here) should not have 
the same breadth of discretion in refusing the 
reestablishment of a new business. The reason-
ableness and justice of such a rule is apparent 
when one reflects on the practicalities of the 
situation where the business has been established 
and operating for some years and thus represents 
a substantial commitment in the time, effort and 
expense by the owner. 
We do not desire to be understood as saying that 
an operating business necessarily has any sue~ 
vested or inviolable right in the renewal of ~ts 
license that t~e licensing authority is without 
discretion in determining whether it should be 
renewed. On the other hand, inasmuch as the 
licensing of his business does repres~nt.a sub-
stantial property interest to the pla~n~~ff, 
which also has its effect upon the publ~c we~fare~ 
it should not be destroyed not disrupted arb~trar~ly, 
-15-
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nor without following fundamental standards of 
due process of law to guard against capricious 
or oppressive administrative action. 
It is further pertinent to observe that because 
beer licenses are available on a quota system 
it seems especially reasonable and proper that 
a business which has had a license and has been 
in operation should have some preference over 
any new application; and that the operating 
business should have its license renewed unless 
there is some reasonable basis for denying it. 
The same considerations of fundamental fairness 
and justice which prevent an administrative body 
from acting in a capricious or arbitrary manner 
in other areas of the law also apply in a beer 
license, even though it is a business which is 
subjected to a high degree of supervision and 
regulation in the interest of the public welfare. 
(citations omitted). 
The foregoing analysis by this Court, reiterates and 
reaffirms the long standing principle of law as stated by 
McQuillin wherein he states: 
" ... the right to carry on a lawful business 
is a property right, which can be taken from a 
licensee only bv due orocess of law, which 
means, it has been held, only after a judicial 
hearing and not on a mere resolution of a city 
council declaring the license revoked .... a 
license once granted may not normally be re-
voked at the mere option or whim of the licensor. 
It is not within the police power of a 
city to revoke without cause a license for which 
it has accepted a substantial fee, and the appli-
cation of this rule, it has been said, is not 
affected by the character of the business. 
McQuillin, §26.8la, pp. 183, 184 (citation omitted, 
emphasis supplied). 
Furthermore, to revoke appellants' license alone, while in the 
same building, within thirty (30) feet on either direction of 
the front door of appellants' place of business, there are 
also two additional establishments selling beer and utilizing 
-16-
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the same parking lot, and not revoke the license of the 
other two establishments is an arbitrary discriminatory act 
on the part of Midvale City. McQuillin adds that: 
":·· ~ ~unicipal~ty has no authority to 
d~scr~m~nate arb~trarily and without 
cause between licensees by revoking one 
license and not those of others who 
occupy exactly the same Position. The 
cause for revocation of a whole class 
of licenses or permits must affect the 
hole class or the revocation will not be 
sustained. In other words, the holder 
of a license is entitled to equal pro-
tection of the laws. McQuillin, S26.8l(a), 
p.l84 (citations omitted). 
Based upon the indicated lack of facts and evidence, 
which at best they can be termed double hearsay, the Midvale 
City Council's action and method of revoking appellants' 
business license was both arbitrary and capricious, denied 
appellants' substantive due process of law and the enforce-
ment of the licensing ordinance and the revocation of the license-
was discriminatory. Nowhere in the record there appears facts 
to justify the city's action in revoking the license; what 
the record shows are facts relating to parking problems, 
fighting, etc., and the cause of which could be the patrons 
of two other establishments located within the same building 
as that of appellants' premises, and an attempt by city officials 
to close down a successful business, without the necessity of a 
judicial determination of the underlying facts and circumstances. 
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POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ENTERING 
ITS ORDER DATED JUNE 25, 1979, WITHOUT 
ENTERING CONCURRENTLY THEREWITH FINDINGS 
OF FACT TO SUPPORT SAID ORDER. 
At the conclusion of the hearing held June 12, 1979, 
in the District Court, the trial Court took the matter under 
advisement, and thereafter it merely entered its Order, as 
it appears on pages 128 and 129 of this record, affirming 
the action of the City Council. Such action by the District 
Court without the formal entry of adequate Findings of Fact 
to support the trial Court's order is reversible error and 
the judgment of the trial Court should be vacated. Anderson 
v. Utah County Board of County Commissioners, P2d 
January 4, 1979. 
Subsequently to appellants' filing of their Notice of 
Appeal, respondents sought to amend the Findings and Order 
of the District Court. The district court allowed respondents 
to " ..• amend the Order entered on the 25th day of June, 1979, 
... "over the objections of appellants, and, thereafter 
respondents filed for the Court's approval Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and an Amended Order of Judgment, 
dated July 3, 1979. 
It is appellants' contention that the trial Court erred 
in granting respondents' motion to amend on the basis and 
for the reason that the District Court lacked jurisdiction 
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to hear respondents·• motion because jurisdiction of this case 
after the Notice of Appeal was filed, rested exclusively with 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
Respondents' Motion to Amend, after the Notice of Appeal 
was filed by appellants, could not continue the jurisdiction 
of the trial Court and could not suspend the finality of 
judgment appealed from, and to do so amounted to reversible 
error. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the trial 
Court should be reversed and the following relief granted: 
1. The revocation of appellants' business license 
by respondents on the theory of abating a nuisance should be 
declared null and void. 
2. In the alternative, this Court should find that the 
revocation of appellants' business license was arbitrary and 
capricious and that City of Midvale should be ordered to re-
instate the same upon payment of the necessary fees by 
appellants. 
3. In the alternative, if this Court upholds the 
District Court in its review of the proceedings held by 
respondents, a restraining order should issue directing 
Midvale City to refrain with appellants' operatio~ of their 
business until the Complaint on file with the District Court 
has been herad on its merits. 
DATED this day of November, 1979. 
Respectfully Submitted 
N?&.~ 
Attorney for Appellants 
610 East South Temple 
Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone No. (801) 521-4441 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and accurate 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS, to Marc Nick 
Mascaro, 7417 South State Street, Midvale, Utah 84047, postage 
prepaid, this ~day of November, 1979. 
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